Legislation and administrative reform by Gulia, Wallace Ph.
LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
REFORM* 
WALLACE PH. GuLIA 
IN the absence of special circumstances, legislation is not a fac­
tor determining Administrative Reform. Administrative Reform de­
pends on the social climate of a country and it can come about as 
all other changes in the country can come about; legislation is on­
ly one such method. If the social climate of the country accepts pe­
culiar standards, be they of bribery, corruption, inefficiency, econo• 
mic wastage or what not, the legislation will naturally reflect those 
peculiar standards but the root of the evil will not be the legisla­
tion itself so much as the peculiar views on which it is based. 
Take away those views and the legislation will be swept away; 
maintain those views and the legislation may get entrenched and 
become stagnant. The remedy, however, is not to look askance at 
the law, but at the social climate which has provided for the exis­
tence of that legislation. 
Legislation becomes necessary only if the social climate had 
led to an administrative framework based on the legislation and 
the administrative framework has to be swept away. Otherwise, le­
gislation hardly comes into the picture at all. The significant ad­
ministrative reforms relating co the recruitment of the British Pub­
lic Services following the mid-19th century reports on recruitment 
into the Service as well as the current reforms in Ci vii Service Re­
cruitment, the Government is currently giving effect to in this 
country, did not require any legislative complementary measures. 
The administration sets its house in order in accordance with its 
lights and within its own framework. If the legislation does not al­
low enough elbow-room, then legislation will be necessary to get 
the necessary elbow-room. But that is all. 
Then too, legislation will be needed for administrative reforms 
involving the exercise of powers which were not contemplated be­
fore, but which the ruling authorities at any given moment of time 
consider desirable. Within the democratic framework of Govern­
ment, as understood in Britain and in this country, Government may 
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not assume new powers unless it is authorized by Parliament, 
which in Britain is Sovereign, and in Malta is Sovereign within 
the Constitution. Thus, for example, the Parliamentary Commis­
sioner came into being in Britain through the relevant Act of Par­
liament (The Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967) because the 
Parliamentary Commissioner (corresponding mutatis mutandis to 
the Ombudsman of other countries) required powers which Govern­
ment did not have in its powers to confer. 
On the other hand, since 'power corrupts and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely' parliament, in the enactment of legislation, 
should not confer powers on the administration too liberally. The 
administration should have enough power for the exercise of its 
functions and no more. If the power conferred is too wide, the citi­
zen becomes faced not with the problem of administrative refonn 
as such, but with the problem of the abuse of discretion which 
could itself •be a factor leading to corruption. In such cases the 
law may fall into ill-repute but the ill-repute should be laid at the 
door of the Government of the day which delegated too much power 
through Parliament on the Administration, and on the Administra­
tion, during whose term of office the power is abused. Indeed, it 
would appear that on many such occasions it is not administrative 
reform which may be required but a tightening up of the controls 
over the way in which the power is to be exercised. 
As administrative lawyers everywhere would phrase it: Parlia­
ment should not confer discretions in too wide a fashion. Where it 
is at all possible to be specific, then Parliament in evolving the 
law should try to be as specific as possible so that the exercise 
of the power will be carried out within the limits contemplated by 
Parliament, rather than by the bureaucrat who happens to be wield­
ing power subject to the authorization of Parliament. 
In the contemporary world it has become increas'ingly necessary 
for Parliament to confer powers on authorities in anticipation of 
problems which would arise administratively. On such occasions 
it is the duty of Parliament to spell out those powers and the cir­
cumstances of the contingency in as much detail as possible to en­
sure that the power will be exercised only in those situations 
where Parliament deems it essential that they be exercised. 
Whilst this is recognised, it must also be recognized that the 
more progressive the system and the more sophisticated the need, 
the more difficult it becomes to evolve water-tight standards which 
can only be applied in specific and particular fact situations; es­
pecially as Parliament legislates for future rather than present-day 
needs. The more difficult the task, however, the more cautious 
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should Parliament be in conferring powers on authorities. Other­
wise there will be large areas of administrative sectors where it
would be possible for 'power to corrupt, etc.'. 
In a small country, such as Malta, where the details of adminis­
trative control easily assume the semblance of policy, inasmuch 
as the demarcation between policy and administration is laid down 
as in other countries where Ministers choose 'to draw the line', 
explosive situations providing illustrations could easily be multi­
farious, incidious and frequently met with; will the public road cut 
across this property or that? Which area will be green and which 
will be a building site? Will the public street light be placed at 
this street corner or that? Which import licenses for consumer 
goods will be issued? Which foreign investments of local capital 
will be permitted? Which buildings will be requisitioned for public 
purposes? 
In fact one of the supreme merits rightly claimed for the Nation­
al Assistance Act, (Malta), when it was being enacted in 1956, 
was specifically this, that henceforth assistance would be payable 
in terms of law and not of administrative discretion as it had been 
payable theretofore, subject as that discretion had been to all 
sorts of sinister influences. If the principle applied in the field of 
National Assistance, is there any reason why it should not be ex­
tended likewise to all those fields where such extension is pos­
sible and where experience has indicated that such sinister motiv­
es can easily come into play? The task here, consequently, reduc­
es itself to finding out those areas where such abuse of discretion 
has been taking place and thereafter the evolution of criteria which 
should be followed in the implementation of the discretion. This 
may be time-consuming but as it is a man-made problem, a man­
made solution should be in sight. 
That an effon should be made in the creation of the legislation 
itself rather than in the application of the legislation by the Courts 
seems clear in view of the limitations which the Courts both in 
Britain and in this country have evolved where the control of po­
wers of the administration are concerned. These problems seem to 
have been overcome to a greater extent that they have been in the 
United Kingdom and in Malta by some continental countries which 
have evolved Administrative Courts within the administration in 
view of the peculiar interpretation given to the doctrine of the se­
paration of powers in such countries. Two such countries are 
France and Italy; the former with its Conseil d'Etat, the latter 
with its Consiglio di Stato, where judicial co_ntrol of administrative 
acts is not as inhibited as it seems to be in British Public Law 
systems. 
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